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Customer Lists as Trade Secrets in Ohio
Although competition is the cornerstone of the free enterprise
system, it can, if not reasonably restrained, be extremely detri-
mental to the functioning of society. One effective method of
control has been established through the law of trade secrets which
satisfied the need of the business community to delineate acceptable
methods of competition. Litigation in this area has steadily in-
creased as society has become technically complex and the working
populace extremely mobile.
Many employers attempt to protect their trade secrets by insert-
ing restrictive covenants in their employment contracts.' However,
if an employer does not use employment contracts or fails to insert a
restrictive covenant when such contracts are used, he must seek ju-
dicial relief in order to prevent his secrets from being disclosed by
a former employee who has either engaged in a similar business
or is employed by a competitor.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the development of
trade secret law in Ohio with respect to the duty owed by a former
employee to his former employer. The discussion will entail: (1)
defining the term trade secret; (2) analyzing the criteria used by
the Ohio courts in determining whether a trade secret exists in a
particular situation; (3) determining the status of customer lists to
illustrate the apparent conflict as to what constitutes a trade secret;
and (4) suggesting reforms Ohio courts could adopt in order to
clarify the area and prevent the piracy of trade secrets.
The area is complicated by the fact that in each case conflicting
rights are involved. The employee has a right to change jobs and
enhance his socio-economic status, while the employer has a right
to insist that information he disclosed in confidence be kept confi-
dential. Both of these rights are inherent in our free enterprise sys-
tem; the decision as to which should dominate is not easily made.
The courts generally approach the area by balancing the right of
the employer against the potential subjection of the employee to a
form of industrial servitude.
1 See generally Note, Validity and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants Not To
Compete, 16 W. REs. L REv. 161 (1964). For a comprehensive list of cases and ma-
terials, see the citations in Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d
685, 687-88 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
TRADE SECRETS IN OHIO
I. TRADE SECRET: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
In Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds,' "trade secret" was
defined as that "which is not well enough or exactly enough known
by any person but the inventor or owner as to enable other persons
to make use of it in trade."3  The court emphasized that the secret
"does not lose its character by being confidentially disclosed to
agents or servants, without whose assistance it could not be made of
any value .... ." Also, the patentability of the secret is of no conse-
quence if the discoverer keeps the process secret, since "a secret may
be property even though it is not patentable."5
A more specific definition was given in National Tube Co. v.
Eastern Tube Co.,6 in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the de-
fendant company from using certain patterns which were converted
by the plaintiff's former employee. The court defined a trade secret
as
a plan or process, tool, mechanism, or compound, known only to its
owner and those of his employes to whom it is necessary to confide
it, in order to apply it to the uses for which it is intended. It is
not protected by patent, for the secret then is made public, ...
while, as soon as anyone fairly and honestly discovers a trade secret,
either by examination of the manufactured products sold or offered
for sale to the public, or in any other honest way, that person dis-
covering it has full right to use the same. That is the risk the
owner takes, and if he would have further protection, he must
seek it in a patents
Ohio traditionally has adhered to this definition! Recently, how-
2 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (Super. Ct. 1887).
3Id. at 157. The court, quoting from Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458
(1868), stated:
[Hie [who) invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture,
whether a proper subject for a patent or not,... has a property in it, which
a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation of contract and
breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to
third persons. Id. at 154.
See generally Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. CINc. 1. REv. 507
(1939), for a discussion of the development of trade secret law.
4 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint at 157.
5Ibid.
63 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 459 (Cir. Ct. App. 1902), aff'd, 69 Ohio St. 560, 70 N.E.
1127 (1903).
7 Id. at 462.
8 See, e.g., Soeder v. Soeder, 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947); Inboden v.
Hawker, 41 N.E.2d 271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941); Case v. Thomas, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 308
(Ct. App. 1927); Cleveland Worm & Gear Co. v. Noyes, 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529 (C.P.
1915).
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ever, the Ohio courts have demonstrated a tendency to liberalize and
expand their concept of "trade secret," as evidenced by present defi-
nitions:9 "[Allmost anything and everything useful or advantageous
in business activity that is not generally known or easily or im-
mediately ascertainable to members of the trade."'"
The adoption of such a broad definition suggests that the Ohio
courts have concluded that the term "trade secret" is incapable of
definition. A like conclusion was reached by the drafters of the
Restatement of Torts who, after defining the term, expressly stated
that an "exact definition of a trade secret is not possible.,"".
However, the difficult nature of the term has not restrained the
courts from deciding whether a trade secret exists in any given case.
Approaching the problem on a case by case basis, the courts have
formulated certain legal guidelines in order to ascertain whether
the article, process, formula, or information can be classified as a
trade secret. An analysis of the elements and factors which Ohio
courts have considered in determining the existence of a trade secret
should clarify the term and consequently enable one to ascertain the
existence vel non of a trade secret in a particular factual situation.'"
9 In B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.B.2d 99
(1963), the court partially adopted the definition of a trade secret given in RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation
of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an oppor-
tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a
list of customers .... Generally it relates to the production of goods, as, for
example, a machine or formula for the production of an article. B. F. Good-
rich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, supra at 498-99, 192 N.E.2d at 104.
The Restatement continued: "It may falso] ... relate to a list of specialized customers."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
'0 Albert B. Cord Co. v. S & P Management Servs., Inc., 194 N.E.2d 173, 175
(Ohio C.P. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Ohio App. 2d 148, 207 N.E.2d 247
(1965).
"1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
12 Ibid. Six factors enumerated in the Restatement of Torts are to be considered
in determining whether the subject matter can be classified as a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business;
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and his competitors;
(5) the amount of money expended by him in developing the information;
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly ac-
quired or duplicated by others. Ibid.
The Ohio courts have used all of the preceding factors. See notes 15-56 infra and ac-
companying text.
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A. Secrecy
In B. F. Goodrich Co. v. W/ohlgemuth,8 an Ohio appellate
court stated that "the subject matter of a trade secret must be secret,
and matters of public knowledge or of general knowledge in an in-
dustry cannot be classified as trade secrets."' 4  Generally, when re-
ferring to "secrecy," the courts consider the subject matter as a
property right. 5 Therefore, there can be no property or protection
right in a process if it is of common knowledge, since these rights
disappear if discovered by fair means.' " Because there is no pre-
sumption of secrecy, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
subject matter is a trade secret of his particular industry." The
proof that is offered must be substantially more than a mere show-
ing of the plaintiff's method of doing business, since it has been
stated that "labeling it 'my method' does not make it secret."' 8
Therefore, if the plaintiff fails to prove that the subject matter is a
secret of his particular industry, it cannot be classified as a trade
secret, since the "right to protection begins and ends with the life of
secrecy."'"
It appears that, in addition to proving secrecy, the plaintiff
must also establish that he has taken adequate security measures to
guard and protect his secret." In Cleveland Worm & Gear Co. v.
Noyes,2 an Ohio court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff, in
assembling a new machine, purchased the component parts from
a variety of places, so that no person other than the proprietors and
their immediate employees would ever see a complete machine in
operation.2 Therefore, it would seem that the more evidence the
'8 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 NXE.2d 99 (1963).
14 Id. at 499, 192 NXE.2d at 104. See also note 12 supra.
15 See, e.g., National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 459 (Cir.
Ct. 1902), af'd, 69 Ohio St. 560,70 N.E. 1127 (1903); Cindnnati Bell Foundry Co. v.
Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (Super. Ct. 1887); Cleveland Worm & Gear Co. v.
Noyes, 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529 (C.P. 1915). But see E. I. DuPont de Nemours Pow-
der Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
1 6 Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, supra note 15, at 155.
1 7 Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 709 (Ohio C.P.
1952).
18 Ibid.
'9 Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 59 (D.N.J. 1958), affl'd, 275
F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960).20 E.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 NB.2d 99
(1963). See also note 12 supra.
21 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529 (C.P. 1915).
22 Id. at 546-47. The court also emphasized that employees were restricted from
those areas of the plant in which they did not work. Ibid.
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plaintiff can produce showing the secrecy of subject matter, the
greater will be the probability that the court will classify the infor-
mation as a trade secret.
B. Novelty
Some degree of novelty is required for the establishment of a
trade secret in a process or machine.23 Generally, however, the
courts have found it difficult to establish a definite standard as to
the degree of novelty required. In Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio
Devices, Inc.,24 a federal district court stated that "while they [trade
secrets] need not amount to invention, in the patent law sense, they
must, at least, amount to discovery."25  The distinction between
"discovery" and "invention" was expressed by the Sixth Circuit in
A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co.:26
Quite dearly discovery is something less than invention. Invention
requires genius, imagination, inspiration, or whatever is the faculty
that gives birth to the inventive concept. Discovery may be the
result of industry, application, or be perhaps merely fortuitous.
The discoverer, however, is entitled to the same protection as the
inventor.27
Apparently, the Ohio courts are in conflict concerning the degree of
novelty required of trade secrets in processes and machines. An
illustrative case is National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 8 in which
the court defined "duplication" in light of the principle that if repro-
duction could be achieved by a skilled workman with the result of no
functional differences between the products, a trade secret could not
have been involved. The court stated that "there might be a
flange here or a flare there, but the idea, the central, main idea has
been in use ...for at least seventeen years."2  Therefore, it ap-
pears that the plaintiff must not only demonstrate that he has em-
ployed creative faculties in his process or machine but also that it is
more than a mere mechanical advancement.50 However, in Cleve-
23 In Boop v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1960), the court stated that
"some degree of novelty was required, otherwise plaintiff could not have had a property
right which he could enforce as against Ford or anyone else." Id. at 200.
24 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
251d. at 265.
26 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cit. 1934).
27 Id. at 538.
283 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 459 (Cir. Ct. 1902).
291d. at 466.
-0 In Victor Chem. Works v. Iiff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921), the court
stated that "a mere mechanical advance in the use of a process is not a new process or
[Vol. 18: 232
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land Worm & Gear Co. v. Noyes,"' the court, in conceding that the
subject matter itself was not a trade secret, established that "the
process of making a more serviceable and efficient drive may well
be secret or involve a series of secrets."3 The Noyes case indicates
that a mechanical improvement of an existing idea may be a trade
secret if there has been a novel application of the idea.3 By ana-
lyzing these two cases, it can be concluded that in order to obtain
relief, the plaintiff must establish some degree of novelty; yet the
degree of novelty required by the Ohio courts is uncertain.
C. Means of Procurement
Generally, when considering the ease or difficulty of duplica-
tion, the courts examine the manner in which the secret was dis-
closed or appropriated. 4  In Cleveland Worm & Gear Co. v.
Noyes, 5 the court stated that "because this discovery may be possi-
ble by fair means ... it would not justify a discovery by unfair
means." 6  In A. O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co.,-
the court held that even though discovery of the machine would be
made obvious by inspection, the value of the discovery is not de-
stroyed when one "by unfair means.., obtains the desired knowl-
edge without himself paying the price in labor, money, or machines
expended by the discoverer."" This position was adopted by an
Ohio court in Fremont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 9 in which it
was stated: "Admitting that some of this information might have
been available from other sources, it could only have been available
after prolonged research and long hours of observation and 'spy-
discovery. To be a new process or discovery there must be employed creative faculties
in originating it amounting to a meritorious discovery or invention." Id. at 546-47, 132
N.E. at 812.
31 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529 (C.P. 1915).
32 Id. at 539.
3 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b at 6-7 (1939) adopted a similar posi-
tion.
3 4 E.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99
(1963); Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (Super. Ct.
1887); Albert B. Cord Co. v. S & P Management Servs., Inc., 194 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio
C.P. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Ohio App. 2d 148, 207 N.E.2d 247 (1965); Fre-
mont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio C.P. 1963); Cleveland Worm
& Gear Co. v. Noyes, 17 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 529 (Ohio C.P. 1915).
35 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 529 (C.P. 1915).
36 Id. at 545, quoting from Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 34, 36 (1889).
37 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1934).
3 Id. at 539.
39 192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
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ing."' 40  These cases suggest that even though the subject matter
is capable of duplication, it would necessitate an expenditure of time
and money. Therefore, the one seeking duplication should bear the
burden of such expense rather than resort to improper methods of
procurement.
D. Value and Expenditures
The factors of value and expenditure are present in all cases,
because classification as a trade secret implies that the secret is of
value to the plaintiff and that his competitors do not possess such
information.4' Ohio's definition of a trade secret dearly states that
the alleged secret must be of value to the possessor.4  Thus, the
court in B. F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth,43 while emphasizing the
years of experimentation, the degree of scientific knowledge and ad-
vanced technology required in research, and the amount of money
expended, stated that "there are... countless secrets which one must
either create or acquire from someone who has already done so.""
Therefore, if plaintiff can show that the secret, if disclosed, would
destroy any advantage he has gained over his competitors and that
he has expended a vast sum of money and considerable time in de-
veloping the secret, the probability that the court will grant in-
junctive relief is greatly enhanced.
E. Breach of Confidence
In recent years, the courts have rejected the concept of a trade
secret as a "property right 4" and have instead approached the prob-
40 Id. at 127. But see Curry v. Marquart, 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937);
Commonwealth Sanitation Co. v. Commonwealth Pest Control Co., 178 N.E.2d 518
(Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Pestel Milk Co. v. Model Dairy Prods. Co., 52 N.E.2d 651 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1943); I-lance v. Peacock, 169 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
41 See notes 4-14 supra and accompanying text.
42 See notes 9-11 supra.
43 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
Id. at 495, 192 N.E.2d at 102.
45 In E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917), the
Court stated that
The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs
have any valuable secret or not the defendant [firm's employee) knows the
facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The
property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting
point ... is not property . . . but that the defendant stood in confidential
relations with the plaintiffs .... Id. at 102. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 18: 232
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lem by determining whether a confidential relationship existed be-
tween the parties. If such a relationship were discovered, relief
would be granted on the basis of either breach of trust or confi-
dence or on an implied quasi-contract existing between employer
and employee to the effect that the employee would not divulge any
trade secrets.4 Thus, "the basis for equitable intervention is the
employee's wrongful conduct in violating the confidence." '47 Under
this philosophy, the courts not only consider the factors previously
discussed but also analyze the following additional elements: the
nature of the employee's position in the plaintiff's company;48 the
employee's degree of access to the information alleged to be a trade
secret;4 specific statements and activities of the employee prior to
leaving the company; 0 the employee's knowledge and experience
4 8 The duty of a former employee concerning trade secrets was expressed in Perfect
Measuring Tape Co. v. Notheis, 93 Ohio App. 507, 114 NE.2d 149 (1953), in which
the court stated:
[When it is made to appear that particular trade practices and trade secrets
of the employer, as distinguished from general secrets of trade, have been en-
trusted to an employee in confidence, in the course of his employment, the
law implies an obligation on such employee not to disclose such trade secrets
or use them to his own advantage in any manner which would amount to a
breach of confidence or of good faith. On the other hand, in the absence of
such implied obligation or any restrictive covenant, an employee who has
quit the service of his employer may use in his own business or in the business
of another, his experience, skill, acumen, memory and general knowledge. Id.
at 513, 114 N.B.2d at 152.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENcY § 396 (1958); Marcuse, The Protection
of Trade Secrets: Theory and Practice, 36 CoNN. B.J. 348 (1962).
4 7 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 500, 192 NXE.2d 99,
105 (1963).
4 8 E.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99
(1963) (head of research division); Soeder v. Soeder, 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d
474 (1947) (plant manager); Fremont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 192 N.E.2d
123 (Ohio C.P. 1963) (truck drivers). But see Curry v. Marquart, 133 Ohio St. 77, 11
N.E.2d 868 (1937) (truck driver).
4 9 In Soeder v. Soeder, 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947), the court empha-
sized that the defendant employee
was given and exercised authority to order materials, supervise employees,
[and] contact customers .... [Djuring the absence of the plaintiffs, he was
in full charge of the business and was directly in charge of and responsible
for the operations of the company. Id. at 74, 77 N.E.2d at 476.
G8 In B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99
(1963), the court placed particular emphasis on the fact that when the employee was
informed that what he was about to divulge was of a confidential nature and belonged
to the plaintiff company, he replied that 'loyalty and ethics had their price; insofar
as he was concerned, International Latex was paying the price .... Once he was a mem-
ber of the Latex Team, he would expect to use all of the knowledge that he had to their
benefit." Id. at 498, 192 NB2d at 104. See also Fremont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio C.P. 1963) (secret meetings of employees prior to terminat-
ing their employment).
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prior to this employment by the plaintiff;5 ' knowledge by the em-
ployee that what he is about to disclose is a trade secret;" and
similarity between the position that the employee held with the
plaintiff and the position that he is now holding.53 These factors,
essential to the granting of relief by a court, are the most difficult to
prove. The problem becomes critical where the employee is a pro-
fessional man or, prior to his employment with the plaintiff, occu-
pied a similar position. The courts are faced with the difficult
problem of balancing these factors in order to decide which of them
should control in a given case. The employer customarily asserts
that he has developed a trade secret through years of experimenta-
tion, expense, and research and that the employee, who has learned
of the process only by reason of his confidential position, is about to
destroy the employer's competitive advantage by divulging the se-
cret. The employee, on the other hand, customarily asserts that he
has a right to practice his lawful occupation and that the knowledge
he possesses, claimed by the employer to be a trade secret, is merely
knowledge and experience which he has gained during the years of
his employment.54 Since much of the litigation in this area has in-
volved the soliciting and disclosure of customer lists, an analysis of
the customer list cases will be useful to illustrate the apparent con-
flict as to what constitutes a trade secret and how the Ohio courts
have attempted to resolve this conflict by applying the previously
discussed factors in cases with similar factual situations.
II. THE STATUS OF CUSTOMER LISTS
When approaching customer list cases, the courts generally
make one of two determinations: (1) whether a customer list is a
trade secret; and (2) whether a confidential relationship existed be-
tween the employee and his former employer. There is a split of
authority as to whether a customer list can be classified as a trade
secret. Some authorities state that it would be an act of unfair
competition to improperly disclose a customer list, since it is a trade
5 1 E.g., Inboden v. Hawker, Inc., 41 N.E.2d 271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941); National
Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 459 (Cir. Ct. 1902); cases cited
note 50 supra. The plaintiff must show that the employee gained the knowledge as a
result of his confidential relationship and not by years of experience in performing his
job.
52 See note 50 supra.
53 See note 48 supra.
54 Inboden v. Hawker, Inc., 41 N.E.2d 271, 276 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
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secret 5  Jurisdictions following this theory would enjoin an em-
ployee from disclosing confidential knowledge of customer lists
which he has acquired during the course of his employment, even
though there is no restrictive covenant in the employment contract. 6
However, other courts state that in the absence of a restrictive
covenant, fraud, or a trade secret, the use of customer lists is per-
missible.5
The conflict is most evident when the list itself is not illegally
appropriated but the employee has memorized the names appearing
on the list. Some jurisdictions hold that this distinction is imma-
terial,58 while others state that since a customer list is not a trade
secret, no confidential relationship has been breached.59 Appar-
ently, the conflict of authority in this area is a result of the failure
of courts to use a uniform definition for the term "trade secret."
In general, those courts which define trade secret in relation to a
"property right" base their determinations on whether the list was
physically taken by the employee."0 If it can be shown that the
employee appropriated the list, relief will be granted on the theory
that the employer has been wrongfully deprived of his property.
Conversely, those jurisdictions which define "trade secret" in relation
to a "breach of confidence" base their decisions on whether a confi-
dential relationship existed between the parties at the time the
5 5 E.g., RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b (1939), which provides that "it
[a trade secret] may. . . relate -o... a list of specialized customers ...." RESTATEMEN
(SEcOND), AGENCY § 396(b) (1958), provides that "the agent ... has a duty to the
principal not to... disclose ... trade secrets... [or]written lists of names ...."
56 In Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952),
the court stated that in order to obtain relief against a former employee the following
circumstances must be shown:
(1) The information was confidential and not readily accessible to competi-
tors; (2) The former employee solicited the customers of his former employer
with intent to injure him; (3) The former employee sought out certain pre-
ferred customers whose trade is particularly profitable and whose identities are
not generally known to the trade; (4) The business is such that a customer
will ordinarily patronize only one concern; (5) The established business rela-
tionship between the customer and the former employer would normally con-
tinue unless interfered with. Id. at 204-05, 246 P.2d at 15.
See also Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625, 653
(1960); Hays, The California Law of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn - Against the
Employer, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 38 (1953).
57 E.g., Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., 122 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 667 (1942); Abalene Exterminating Co. v. Elges, 137 N.J. Eq. 1,
43 A.2d 165 (Ch. 1945); Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 162 A.2d 370
(1960).
58 See note 56 supra.
59 See cases cited note 57 supra.
60 See discussion of cases in text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
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employee secured the list."' These courts, in regarding the taking
of the list itself as immaterial, concern themselves solely with deter-
mining the existence of a confidential relationship between the
parties.
A. The View Taken by Ohio Courts
Curry v. Marquart,62 the only customer list case that has been
considered by the Ohio Supreme Court, established that
in the absence of an express contract, on taking a new employment
in a competing business an employee may solicit for his new em-
ployer the trade or business of his former [employer's] customers
and will not be enjoined from so doing at the instance of his
former employer.68
However, the court emphasized that "disclosures of trade secrets by
an employee secured by him in the course of confidential employ-
ment will be restrained by the process of injunction" and that the
proscribed disclosure would extend to "lists of customers regarded
as confidential."64  The court held that the case involved no ques-
tion of trade secrets or confidential information, and although the
decisions are conflicting, stated that "no well considered case has
gone so far as to hold that one may be enjoined from seeking to do
business with friends, though they become such in the course of and
as a result of previous employment." 5
It was emphasized that to rule otherwise "'would tend to destroy
the freedom of employees and to reduce them to a condition of in-
dustrial servitude.' "66 The Ohio Supreme Court did not directly con-
sider the proposition that a route salesman could be in a confidential
relationship with the employer even though he acquired the names
of the customers during his employment; instead, the court indi-
rectly disposed of this argument by stating that such services did not
require any special -knowledge, skill, or ability. 7 It was further
asserted that "there was no confidential list of customers or other
information of a confidential character,"68 thus raising the implica-
61 See, e.g., Curry v. Marquart, 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
62 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
63 Id. at 79, 11 N.E.2d at 869.
64 Id. at 80, 11 N.E.2d at 869.
65 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
6 61d. at 80, 11 N.E.2d at 869, quoting from Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson,
140 Md. 359, 362, 117 At. 753, 754 (1922).
67 133 Ohio St. at 80, 11 N.E.2d at 869.
68 Id. at 79, 11 N.E.2d at 869.
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tion that in order for a customer list to be classified as a trade secret,
the employee must have taken the actual written list. Therefore,
the Curry decision indicates that in order for a customer list to be
classified as a trade secret, the property of the employer must have
been wrongfully appropriated, such property being the physical list
itself. The Curry case was heard by the supreme court on a motion
to certify the record on the basis of a claim by the court of appeals
that its decision was in conflict with the case of French Bros. Bauer
Co. v. Townsend Bros. Milk Co.69 The latter case held:
If a written list of the route customers was kept by plaintiff com-
pany, and the employes, or the defendant company, took the list
and used the same, it is a well-recognized rule that injunctive re-
lief would be proper. While there is no written list of such cus-
tomers, the former employes knew and had in mind every such
customer, and the reason for the rule is just as pertinent under
these circumstances as though there had been a written list. 0
In its opinion the court in the Curry case never mentioned the
Bauer decision but simply concluded that there was no trade secret
or confidential relationship involved.7' Therefore, the precise status
of an unwritten customer list was not determined in Curry, since it
neither overruled nor distinguished the Bauer case.
However, in Pestel Milk Co. v. Model Dairy Prods. Co.,72 in
which evidence was introduced that the employee had copied a por-
tion of the list before terminating his agency, the court of appeals
cited Curry as controlling and denied relief.73 It was stated that as
a "general proposition the activities of these two men could not, in
our judgment, be classified as confidential."'74 The court justified
its decision by concluding that "there is scarcely a business in which
there is competition, where one does not seek to acquire information
or even the services of former employees so as to promote one's
business, probably at the expense of his rival."7  On application
for rehearing,76 the court distinguished the Bauer case by classifying
it as an action "for injunction on the ground of unfair competi-
6921 Ohio App. 177, 152 N.E. 675 (1925).
70 Id. at 180, 152 N.E. at 676.
71 Curryv. Marquart, 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 NX.2d 868 (1937).
7252 N.E.2d 651 (Ohio Ct. App.), application for rehearing & certificate of conflict
denied, 52 N.E2d 659 (Ohio Ct App. 1943).
73 Id. at 658.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Pestel Milk Co. v. Model Dairy Prods. Co., 52 N.E.2d 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
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tion,"77 whereas the case at bar was a contract action which would
be controlled by the ruling of Curry.8  It can reasonably be con-
cluded that the Pestel case interpreted Curry v. Marquartm to mean
that customer lists per se are not trade secrets and that if the action
is in tort, the customer list is a trade secret, whereas if the action is
in contract or quasi-contract, the list is not a secret.
B. The Conflict Created by Curry v. Marquart
In 1947, four years after the Pestel decision, the court of ap-
peals in Soeder v. Soeder ° enjoined the defendant employees from
soliciting the plaintiff's customers. The defendant had been en-
gaged in a wholesale dairy business which went into bankruptcy
and was purchased by the plaintiff company. Prior to the sale in
bankruptcy, the defendant entered the employ of the plaintiff and
turned over to the plaintiff a list of customers from the then-bank-
rupt company. After working four years, the defendant had au-
thority to order materials, supervise employees, and had full access
to all phases of the plaintiff's business. The court, citing Curry,
stated that the defendant, "while free to engage in a competitive
business, may not solicit.., those customers of plaintiffs of which
he learned during the time he was employed in a confidential ca-
pacity."'" However, the defendant was free to solicit those custom-
ers whom he had brought to the plaintiff company when he began
his employment, since these customers were not acquired in a confi-
dential capacity." The language of the court indicates that it is ir-
relevant whether the list was memorized rather than physically ap-
propriated. The important fact was that disclosure of the list to the
defendant was in confidence; as a result of this relationship, the cus-
tomer list could be classified as a trade secret.
This view was adopted in Hance v. Peacock,83 in which it was
stated that "lists of customers are regarded as trade secrets or confi-
dential information." '84 The Pestel and Curry cases (customer lists
are not trade secrets) were summarily distinguished through the
court's statement that an employment contract was involved in the
77 Id. at 660.
78 Ibid.
79 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
80 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947).
81 Id. at 76, 77 N.E.2d at 476.
82 Ibid.
83 169 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
84 Id. at 566.
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case at bar, 5 whereas none was involved in the two above mentioned
cases; however, this distinction does not seem valid, since the em-
ployment contract did not contain a restrictive covenant.8" The
Hance decision was, instead, predicated upon the Bauer" case (cus-
tomer list is a trade secret), as relief was granted with emphasis on
the inconsistent statements of Curry.88
However, in Commonwealth Sanitation Co. v. Pest Control
Co.,89 the court of appeals denied an injunction, stating that "the list
of customers, so far as the evidence before us discloses, was not
copied and carried away from Commonwealth.""0  It appears that
the court utilized a "property concept approach," implying that a
customer list could not be classified as a trade secret since the cus-
tomers' names could be obtained through a city directory or tele-
phone book and therefore were not secret.9 The fact that Soeder
v. Soeder 2 was in full accord with Curry v. Marquart93 was noted
in the opinion;" yet the results of the two cases are different. In
comparing the Soeder case (customer list is a trade secret) to the
Curry case (customer list is not a trade secret), the court cited only
the first premise of Curry,5 ignoring the statement that "disclosures
of trade secrets by an employee secured by him in the course of con-
fidential employment will be restrained by the process of injunction.
... [Such disclosures would includel lists of customers regarded as
confidential."" It appears that it was upon this premise and not
the one quoted by the court in the Commonwealth case that Soeder
was decided. Apparently, the court, in failing to consider whether
the employee owed a confidential duty to his employer, reverted
to the "property concept" of a trade secret as enunciated in the Curry
case.
85 Ibid.
861d. at 565.
87 French Bros. Bauer Co. v. Townsend Bros. Milk Co., 21 Ohio App. 177, 152
N.E. 675 (1925).
8 8 Hance v. Peacock, 169 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
89 178 N.B.2d 518 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
BOld. at 521.
91 Ibid.
92 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947).
93 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
94 Commonwealth Sanitation Co. v. Pest Control Co., 178 N.E.2d 518, 520 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1961).
95 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
9 8 Curry v. Marquart, 133 Ohio St. 77, 80, 11 N.E.2d 868, 869 (1937).
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In Albert B. Cord Co. v. S & P Management Servs., Inc., 7 the
court of common pleas held that
the information available to the defendants .. .was confidential
information and was the property of the plaintiff .... The de-
fendants were confidential employees entrusted with information,
in the regular course of their employment, of such a nature that it
was not necessary that there be a written customer list for an in-
junction to issue. The defendants are men of high intelligence
and this Court concludes that their memories are as good as any
written list.98
The court reached its decision by considering the particular factors of
the case instead of making a technical distinction as to whether the
list was written or memorized. It appears that the court, in adopt-
ing a hybrid approach to the problem, concluded that the plaintiff
still had a property right in the information and, further, that the
defendants were in a confidential relationship when the information
was obtained.99 The opinion indicates that there can be no valid
distinction drawn between a list that was written and taken by the
employee and one that is memorized by the employee.' 0 How-
ever, on appeal the decision was reversed,' the appellate court
holding that "the evidence.., does not disclose any trade secrets or
confidential information relative to plaintiff's business."'0 2 It was
further stated that the case at bar "comes clearly within the rule laid
down in Curry v. Marquart."'0 3 The reversal of the trial court's
"memory" decision was simply phrased: "This is not the law. If
it were, then no salesman or any other employee could leave his
employer and go into business.., for surely he would have some
'memory' of what he had learned in his employer's business."'04
The Cord case illustrates that the status of a customer list as a
trade secret is presently in a state of confusion. There is a desperate
need for clarity as to which view Ohio considers as controlling.
The conflicting decisions have resulted in either an application of
the general principle of law found in Curry v. Marquart,0  without
9 194 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio CP. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Ohio App. 2d 148,
207 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
98 Id. at 176. (Emphasis added.)
99 ld. at 176.
100 Ibid.
101 Albert B. Cord Co. v. S & P Management Servs., Inc., 2 Ohio App. 2d 148, 207
N.E.2d 247 (1965).
102 d. at 149, 207 N.E.2d at 247.
103 d. at 150, 207 N.E.2d at 248.
104 Ibid.
105 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
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regard to the particular facts of the case, or the court searching for
technical distinctions between the Curry case and their instant case
in order to grant relief.
III. SUGGESTED PROPOSALS FOR CLARIFICATION
A. Proposed Test
The most urgent proposal to be suggested is that Ohio reconsid-
er the underlying legal philosophy which should govern trade se-
cret cases. It has already been suggested that there are at least six
theories of law on the basis of which protection is given to the owner
of a trade secret: (1) property right, (2) breach of confidence or
trust, (3) implied contract, (4) unfair competition, (5) tortious inva-
sion of privacy of a specialized nature, and (6) enforcement of con-
tracts.
106
When faced with flagrant violations of duty, the Ohio courts
have customarily adopted the theories of implied contract and breach
of confidence. °7 However, as evidenced by the customer list cases,
when the violation of the employee's duty was not flagrant, the
courts have labeled trade secrets as "property rights."108
It is submitted that a better practice would be for the courts to
consider both the "property" and "breach of confidence" theories in
any given case. Thus, in deciding a trade secret case, there would
be a determination of at least two issues of fact: (1) Is this informa-
tion a trade secret? and (2) Did the employee acquire knowledge of
the information while in a confidential relationship? This pro-
posed test was enunciated in Judge Taft's analysis of the facts in the
case of Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds."9  The adoption of
such an approach would require the courts to consider both, and not
simply the first, of the above questions. When the Ohio courts
have ruled that a trade secret does not exist, the confidential rela-
tionship aspects of the case have normally been ignored.
3
0 See generally Marcuse, The Protection of Trade Secrets: Theory and Practice,
36 CONN. B.J. 348, 351 (1962); Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 4, 22
(1962).
107E.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99
(1963); Perfect Measuring Tape Co. v. Notheis, 93 Ohio App. 507, 114 NE.2d 149
(1953); Soeder v. Soeder, 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947); Fremont Oil Co. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio C.P. 1963).
108E.g., Curry v. Marquarr, 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E.2d 868 (1937); Albert B.
Cord Co. v. 8 & P Management Servs., Inc., 194 NE.2d 173 (Ohio C.P. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 2 Ohio App. 2d 148, 207 N.E.2d 247 (1965); Commonwealth Sanita-
tion Co. v. Commonwealth Pest Control Co., 178 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
109 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154 (Super. Ct. 1887).
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In applying the suggested test, the Ohio courts would no longer
base their decisions solely on the fact that what was taken was not
a trade secret but would also consider whether the disclosure or
threatened disclosure would constitute a breach of confidence by the
employee. The courts would approach the problem by considering
the factors previously discussed and from these factors make the
ultimate determination as to whether the employee appropriated a
trade secret or breached a confidential relationship. Rather than
general principles of law determining the outcome, the facts and
circumstances of the particular case would control.
B. Criminal Sanctions
Some writers have suggested that criminal sanctions be adopted
to deter the piracy of trade secrets."' New York". and New Jer-
sey".2 have statutory provisions which make it a misdemeanor to
disclose trade secrets or confidential information. Although Ohio
does not have a specific statute that is directly applicable, section
2923.29 of the Ohio Revised Code can be utilized in a specific cir-
cumstance. It provides:
No person employed as a stenographer shall furnish to a person
other than his employer, without the consent of such employer, a
transcript or copy . .. of any matter taken by him while so em-
ployed or read it to or permit it to be read by a person other than
his employer, without such employer's consent, or disclose it ... to
any person....
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than
twenty-five nor more than five-hundred dollars or imprisioned not
more than six months, or both."13
Although this statute deals only with stenographers, it does illustrate
Ohio's concern over the severity of a breach of confidence. On
the basis of section 2923.29, a criminal sanction is already a part
of the existing penal law of Ohio. Therefore, if this section were
amended by the phrase, "any person disclosing any confidential in-
formation entrusted to him," it would seem that the statute could
110 Stedman, supra note 106, at 30.
"'N.Y. PEN. LAw § 439(1); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 553(6) (customer list statute).
112 N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 170-88(1) (Supp. 1953).
113 01O REV. CODE § 2923.29. See also OHIo REV. CODE § 3715.52 which pro-
hibits "the using by any person to his own advantage [of] ... any information acquired
... concerning any information which as a trade secret is entitled to protection." How-
ever, this section is under Ohio Revised Code chapter 3715 entitled "Pure Food and
Drug Law." The applicability of the section is limited to the area of food and drug,
and the lack of a criminal sanction for the first offense would seem to reduce its effec-
tiveness as a deterrent.
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apply in most trade secret cases involving employers and former
employees.
If the Ohio Legislature were to adopt a criminal sanction, it
would serve a twofold purpose. First, it would act as a deterrent to
employees against divulging trade secrets or breaching their confi-
dential relationships. Secondly, a criminal sanction would force the
employee to inquire as to whether the information he is about
to disclose could be classified as a trade secret. In this respect, a
penal statute would serve as a preventive measure by encouraging
negotiations between the employer and employee; they could, in
many cases, decide the status of the information without petitioning
the court for a judicial determination.
Other writers have suggested the adoption of a national trade
secret law.1 While such an act would create a uniform trade se-
cret policy and serve as a deterrent to piracy," 5 it would still be im-
possible under any uniform act to determine if in fact a trade secret
existed in any given case or if there were a breach of confidence.
The classification of the information as a trade secret or the estab-
lishment of a confidential relationship cannot extend beyond the
facts and circumstances of the particular case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there is a manifest conflict as to what constitutes a
trade secret, it is an accepted principle that this phase of business
competition must be regulated. As our society becomes vastly com-
plex and our working populace continue to develop into skilled
technicians, the subtle distinction between trade secrets and general
secrets of trade becomes more difficult to draw. The courts are
faced with the delicate task of balancing the interests of both parties
in attempting to obtain an equitable result.
The employer who has spent thousands of dollars in research
and experimentation is threatened with the loss of his entire invest-
ment by one former employee disclosing in a matter of minutes
what has taken years of research to develop. The employee, on the
other hand, is threatened with being subjected to a form of industrial
servitude after the years of education, training, and experience that
enabled him to become proficient in his chosen occupation or pro-
fession. Coupled with these conflicting interests are those of the
114 E.g., Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L.
REV. 437, 465 (1961); Stedman, supra note 106, at 32.
115 Ibid.
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general public which deserves better products yet may be denied
them by the creation of a legal monopoly under the guise of a trade
secret.
Resolution of the trade secret conflict can best be achieved by an
analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding each individual
case, for this manner of approach offers the greatest probability of
attaining a uniformly just result.
JOSEPH PAUL VALENTINO
